WE DISAGREE WITH THE U.S WITHDRAWL FROM SYRIA: U.S. Department of State Weekly Digest Bulletin

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U.S. Department of State Weekly Digest Bulletin Inbox x U.S. Department of State <usstatebpa@public.govdelivery.com> 12:06 PM (45 minutes ago)  to me Secretary's Remarks: Bhutan National Day 12/16/2018 You are subscribed to Secretary's Remarks for U.S. Department of State. This information has recently been updated, and is now available. Secretary's Remarks: Bhutan National Day 12/16/2018 02:23 PM EST Press Statement Michael R. Pompeo Washington, DC December 16, 2018 On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I would like to extend best wishes to the people of Bhutan on the occasion of their National Day on December 17. The United States is deeply appreciative of the growing connections between the American and Bhutanese people. As fellow democracies, the United States and Bhutan are committed to fundamental liberties and the rule of law. We commend Bhutan’s transition to democracy, enacted under the leadership of His Majesty the King, and demonstrated by the exemplary national elections held this year. We look forward to working with the government of Prime Minister Lotay Tshering. In the coming year, the United States looks forward to growing our strong relationship with Bhutan. We wish the Bhutanese people a prosperous and joyous year. The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein. Arms Control and International Security: Palau Endorses the Proliferation Security Initiative 12/18/2018 You are subscribed to Arms Control and International Security for U.S. Department of State. This information has recently been updated, and is now available. Arms Control and International Security: Palau Endorses the Proliferation Security Initiative 12/18/2018 07:27 AM EST Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation December 17, 2018 The United States welcomes the decision by the Republic of Palau to endorse the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and looks forward to working with the Government of Palau to advance the nonproliferation goals of the PSI and its Statement of Interdiction Principles. The Republic of Palau is the 106th state to become a PSI participant. Launched in Krakow, Poland in 2003, PSI participants commit to undertake measures, on a voluntary basis and consistent with their authorities and resources, to interdict illicit transfers of weapons of mass destruction- and missile-related items, exchange relevant information, and strengthen legal authorities to conduct interdictions. Participants also conduct exercises, workshops, and other activities to improve their capacities to fulfill their PSI commitments. The addition of each new participating state strengthens the Initiative and helps ensure that it will remain a durable international effort in the years ahead. The United States urges all responsible states to endorse and participate in the PSI. For more information on the Proliferation Security Initiative, please see the State Department’s website: http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm. The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein. Europe and Eurasia: Press Availability With Prime Minister Zaev 12/18/2018 You are subscribed to Europe and Eurasia for U.S. Department of State. This information has recently been updated, and is now available. Europe and Eurasia: Press Availability With Prime Minister Zaev 12/18/2018 08:20 AM EST Press Availability John J. Sullivan Skopje, Macedonia December 18, 2018 DEPUTY SECRETARY SULLIVAN: Thank you for that kind introduction, Prime Minister. It is a great honor to be here with you today. I have had already a fruitful visit to Macedonia. I have had the honor of meeting several government officials. As I have discussed in my meetings with Prime Minister Zaev, with Foreign Minister Dimitrov, the United States strongly supports full implementation of the Prespa Agreement, which will allow Macedonia to take its rightful place in NATO and the EU as the Republic of North Macedonia, contributing to regional stability, security, and prosperity. We are committed to the security and stability of southeast Europe, and Macedonia is a key part of that stability. Indeed, we see Macedonia as a leader in the region in its commitment to peace, stability, and cooperation. I applaud Prime Minister Zaev and Foreign Minister Dimitrov, and the courageous leadership of those Members of Parliament who, in October, took the next step to secure a brighter future for Macedonia and its citizens. Your votes have set your country on a path to a safer, more secure, and more prosperous future. Now, as the implementation process continues in Parliament, we urge more members to set aside partisan interests and remain focused on your shared strategic goals. There is no alternative answer. Your hopes for a brighter future for your country are within your grasp. It is critical that Macedonia not lose sight of its reform priorities to strengthen the rule of law, enhance the independence of the judiciary, and to improve governance and the capacity of institutions to serve the people. The United States shares your commitment to peace and security in the region and the world, and we look forward to an even closer partnership in the future. Thank you again, Prime Minister, for your kind hospitality and for such a productive visit. QUESTION: If the process succeeds in Macedonia, is it also likely to succeed in Greece, bearing in mind existing disagreements in the Greek Government over the Prespa Agreement and the announcements of [Greek Defense Minister] Kamenos that his party will leave the government? Can the tight majority adopt the Agreement, and what happens if it is not adopted? DEPUTY SECRETARY SULLIVAN: Thank you for that question. Of course, it is an Agreement with two sides, an agreement reached by two courageous leaders. We are convinced in the United States that this Agreement is profoundly in the national interest of both Macedonia and Greece. Secretary Pompeo met with a Greek delegation last week as part of the Strategic Dialogue with Greece, and we’re in agreement with Greek colleagues on the importance of the Prespa Agreement, its importance for the future of Greece. We look forward to supporting Greece as it implements the Prespa Agreement, for the prosperity and the future of both Greece and Macedonia, and their relationship together. Again, I want to emphasize the courageous leadership of the two prime ministers, of Macedonia and Greece. The Agreement that they have reached for the benefit of their respective countries and the region is something that the United States is proud to support and the principal reason that I am here today. Thank you. QUESTION: We are seeing increasingly hostile rhetoric in the region against Macedonia, especially as the Prespa Agreement is moving towards final ratification. Do you see Russian influence in this, especially as Moscow openly opposes the Agreement and is possibly putting all efforts for the Agreement to fail? DEPUTY SECRETARY SULLIVAN: I am proud to stand here on behalf of the United States in support of what the Government of Macedonia and the people of Macedonia want – which is accession to NATO and the EU. They support this Government and its efforts to achieve that, including the Prespa Agreement. I am proud to support that; the United States is proud to support that. We support it; we are not instigating it. These are decisions that have been made under what I have previously described as the courageous leadership of this Prime Minister. The United States stands in support of that. I don’t think it is any secret that the Russian government stands in opposition, in opposition to NATO membership for Macedonia and, I think it is fair to say, will undertake whatever activities they could to undermine, for its own interests, what the Macedonian people and the Macedonian government have decided are in this country’s best interests. The United States stands with Macedonia. I don’t think it’s any surprise to anyone in this room that Russia is opposed to the path that Macedonia has chosen, and [Russia] will implement means that will try to undermine that, any means available that they can. We have seen that in other parts of Europe, we have seen that in U.S. elections previously in 2016, for example. So, that’s not a surprise; but again, I want to emphasize it’s the United States that is standing with Macedonia, with its courageous government, with the people of Macedonia. We will assist others who are united in supporting this government in confronting and exposing Russian malign influence in Macedonia, elsewhere in this region or in Europe or wherever it seeks to undermine the legitimate democratic processes in governments that have made decisions in the interests of their people, as Macedonia has done here. We will stand with those governments; we will stand in opposition to that malign influence, do all we can to oppose it and expose it. The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein. Arms Control and International Security: The Structure and Future of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 12/18/2018 You are subscribed to Arms Control and International Security for U.S. Department of State. This information has recently been updated, and is now available. Arms Control and International Security: The Structure and Future of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 12/18/2018 10:50 AM EST Remarks Dr. Christopher Ashley Ford House of Lords, Palace of Westminster, London, United Kingdom December 12, 2018 As delivered: Good morning, Lord Chairman. It is a pleasure to be here to speak with you about a profound and abiding interest that our two countries share: the continued integrity and survival of the global nonproliferation regime. We have had this shared interest for many years, and for the last five decades, the centerpiece of our work together in this endeavor has revolved around the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or NPT — which was opened for signature 50 years ago last summer, and which will have been in force for half a century by the time of the NPT Review Conference in 2020. I would like to outline for you our preparations for that Review Conference, but first I hope you’ll indulge me for a moment while I offer what I hope is a useful metaphor for thinking about the NPT and the complex relationship of its constituent elements. I. Multiple Pillars, One Foundation It has become commonplace, in recent years, to speak of the NPT as having “three pillars” — that is, three explicitly or implicitly coequal elements in the form of nonproliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. This “three pillars” formulation, however, is not intrinsic to the Treaty or part of its original understanding. It is no more than a turn of phrase that people happened to start using after a while, quite a few years after the Treaty’s negotiation, and for reasons merely of convenience. It emerged after the U.S. made a proposal in 1984, at the Second Preparatory Committee of that review cycle, that the 1985 Review Conference have three main committees — dealing, respectively, with nonproliferation and safeguards, peaceful uses, and disarmament. Ten years later, at the NPT Review and Extension Conference, these three issues began to be referred to as the “three pillars” of the NPT. But that’s it. The phrasing was just an artifact of choices of convenience about nothing more grand than how to organize Review Conference meetings. “Three pillars” phrasing, therefore, in no way represented any kind of doctrinal or philosophical conclusion about the architecture of the NPT, and with good reason. Unfortunately, it has nonetheless been mistaken for such, and has helped lead subsequent generations to forget important truths they need to remember if the nonproliferation regime is to thrive or even to survive. The imagery of “three pillars” misleads because it tends to suggest coequality, much as three legs might support a simple stool — which is to say, equally indispensably, and in such a way that one cannot extend or shorten any one leg without making corresponding adjustments to the other legs. This, I would argue, is quite profoundly mistaken, not to mention dangerous to the health of the NPT regime. In fact, the NPT’s nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful-use aspects are not at all like three separate legs of a stool. To my eye, the better image here is that of building vital structures upon a foundation — that is, upon a base without which those two additional vital structures would collapse. As the name of the “Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons” suggests, the conceptual and structural core of the NPT is nonproliferation, and this is the foundation upon which rest the two supported “structures” of nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses. At risk of belaboring the analogy, one might perhaps think of peaceful uses as some kind of granary or storehouse, which enriches the surrounding population — but which cannot fulfil this vital function if it is not built upon a solid foundation and thus falls into ruin. Disarmament might similarly be thought of as something akin to a stairway: a structure that we hope will lead us up to a better and brighter future — but which cannot fulfil this vital function if not built upon solid rock. Both peaceful uses and disarmament require a foundation of nonproliferation assurances if they are to produce for mankind the prosperity and safety envisioned in the NPT. The potential power of nuclear technology is such that the widespread sharing of nuclear materials and know-how would be neither safe nor sane if one could not rely upon sound assurances that these things would not be lost, stolen, or misappropriated for non-peaceful purposes. And today’s weapons possessors would surely never agree to relinquish their own nuclear arsenals were they not confident that other states would not thereafter build such weapons themselves. Both of those two “pillars” thus are neither coequal with nor do they compete with nonproliferation. In truth, they depend upon nonproliferation. This is not to dismiss the importance of peaceful uses, nor of disarmament. To the contrary, they are of enormous importance, and it is in part precisely for the benefits these aspects of the Treaty provide that we should all prize and preserve the integrity of the nonproliferation regime. But we should also not confuse ourselves about the relationship between these elements, because in misdiagnosing this relationship we could squander the chance to preserve the nonproliferation foundation upon which everything depends. II. An NPT Agenda for 2020 So with that preface, let me briefly outline the U.S. diplomatic agenda as we approach the 2020 Review Conference. Our agenda begins with reaffirming the centrality of nonproliferation and the importance of preserving the integrity of the nonproliferation regime — not only for the security benefits that nonproliferation provides to all (and perhaps especially states in the developing world) by helping preclude neighbors and rivals from developing nuclear weapons, but also because nonproliferation is a sine qua non enabler for peaceful nuclear sharing and for disarmament progress. If they cannot rest upon a solid foundation of nonproliferation assurances, as I have noted, these two critical projects will collapse. So our message is one of strengthening nonproliferation for all these reasons. This means, first and foremost, vigorous and resolute international cooperation to resolve the two biggest challenges facing the nonproliferation regime today: (1) bringing about the final and fully verified denuclearization of North Korea; and (2) finally ensuring that Iran never again has any pathway to a nuclear weapon. Remembering the way that these two countries’ illicit nuclear weapons programs have so profoundly destabilized two critical regions of the world, moreover, we must take steps to make it more difficult for countries caught in violation of the NPT to exercise the option of withdrawing from it — as North Korea did — to continue such programs. We must also work tirelessly to strengthen the system of nuclear safeguards that are essential for credible nonproliferation assurances. This means ensuring that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has the resources and authorities it needs, and that it is both willing and able to exercise these authorities by following any and all credible information wherever the evidentiary trail may lead. We must ensure universal adherence to the IAEA Additional Protocol as the global safeguards standard, and promote universal adherence to nuclear safety and security best practices. But precisely because we remain firmly committed not only to the success of the nonproliferation regime in itself, but also to disarmament and to sharing the benefits of nuclear technology, we cannot leave it at that. Accordingly, our NPT diplomacy also aims to highlight, promote, and accelerate peaceful nuclear uses worldwide — both in the generation of nuclear power and in the full range of health, industrial, medical, agricultural, and research applications that are facilitated by nuclear science, as I outlined in my remarks to the IAEA Ministerial on Science and Technology on November 28. As for the important global project of trying to advance toward a world safely and sustainably free of nuclear weapons, as I outlined at Wilton Park two days ago on December 10, we have embarked upon an important new initiative to build a structured multilateral dialogue dedicated to ameliorating those conditions in the security environment that presently make it so difficult to achieve further disarmament progress. In sharp contrast to the counterproductive and magical thinking represented by the so-called nuclear weapons “Ban” treaty, our new initiative is based upon common sense, and upon our experience in achieving the extraordinary disarmament progress the world has seen since the end of the Cold War. Just as it took the waning of Cold War tensions to make possible the dramatic reductions that have occurred in the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals over the last three decades — reductions in which we ourselves in the United States, for instance, have cut back our arsenal by about 88 percent from its Cold War peak — one cannot expect to see the achievement of a nuclear weapons-free world without ameliorating those conditions in the regional and global security environments that still make the acquisition of nuclear weapons so attractive to some, and the idea of relinquishing them so alarming to others. So we have launched a new, global dialogue aimed at finding ways to do this — aiming, as the Preamble to the NPT itself exhorts us, to ease tensions and strengthen trust between states in order to facilitate disarmament. As I outlined at Wilton Park, as part of our expanding initiative to foster conditions amenable to more nuclear disarmament progress, we are launching a new structured dialogue to bring together participating states to explore solutions to key practical challenges that stand in the way of achieving a nuclear weapons-free world. This is an exciting new effort, and — as an example of our genuine commitment to disarmament progress — we hope to have this structured dialogue in full swing before the 2020 Review Conference. It is our earnest hope that our historical cousins in the United Kingdom will stand side-by-side with us in this important endeavor. III. Conclusion I am grateful for the chance to outline these U.S. perspectives and priorities to you as we think about how our two great nations can best work together to strengthen the NPT in all its aspects. Thank you for listening. The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein. Speeches: The Structure and Future of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 12/18/2018 You are subscribed to Speeches, Remarks, Testimony (other than by the Secretary) for U.S. Department of State. This information has recently been updated, and is now available. Speeches: The Structure and Future of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 12/18/2018 10:50 AM EST Remarks Dr. Christopher Ashley Ford House of Lords, Palace of Westminster, London, United Kingdom December 12, 2018 As delivered: Good morning, Lord Chairman. It is a pleasure to be here to speak with you about a profound and abiding interest that our two countries share: the continued integrity and survival of the global nonproliferation regime. We have had this shared interest for many years, and for the last five decades, the centerpiece of our work together in this endeavor has revolved around the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or NPT — which was opened for signature 50 years ago last summer, and which will have been in force for half a century by the time of the NPT Review Conference in 2020. I would like to outline for you our preparations for that Review Conference, but first I hope you’ll indulge me for a moment while I offer what I hope is a useful metaphor for thinking about the NPT and the complex relationship of its constituent elements. I. Multiple Pillars, One Foundation It has become commonplace, in recent years, to speak of the NPT as having “three pillars” — that is, three explicitly or implicitly coequal elements in the form of nonproliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. This “three pillars” formulation, however, is not intrinsic to the Treaty or part of its original understanding. It is no more than a turn of phrase that people happened to start using after a while, quite a few years after the Treaty’s negotiation, and for reasons merely of convenience. It emerged after the U.S. made a proposal in 1984, at the Second Preparatory Committee of that review cycle, that the 1985 Review Conference have three main committees — dealing, respectively, with nonproliferation and safeguards, peaceful uses, and disarmament. Ten years later, at the NPT Review and Extension Conference, these three issues began to be referred to as the “three pillars” of the NPT. But that’s it. The phrasing was just an artifact of choices of convenience about nothing more grand than how to organize Review Conference meetings. “Three pillars” phrasing, therefore, in no way represented any kind of doctrinal or philosophical conclusion about the architecture of the NPT, and with good reason. Unfortunately, it has nonetheless been mistaken for such, and has helped lead subsequent generations to forget important truths they need to remember if the nonproliferation regime is to thrive or even to survive. The imagery of “three pillars” misleads because it tends to suggest coequality, much as three legs might support a simple stool — which is to say, equally indispensably, and in such a way that one cannot extend or shorten any one leg without making corresponding adjustments to the other legs. This, I would argue, is quite profoundly mistaken, not to mention dangerous to the health of the NPT regime. In fact, the NPT’s nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful-use aspects are not at all like three separate legs of a stool. To my eye, the better image here is that of building vital structures upon a foundation — that is, upon a base without which those two additional vital structures would collapse. As the name of the “Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons” suggests, the conceptual and structural core of the NPT is nonproliferation, and this is the foundation upon which rest the two supported “structures” of nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses. At risk of belaboring the analogy, one might perhaps think of peaceful uses as some kind of granary or storehouse, which enriches the surrounding population — but which cannot fulfil this vital function if it is not built upon a solid foundation and thus falls into ruin. Disarmament might similarly be thought of as something akin to a stairway: a structure that we hope will lead us up to a better and brighter future — but which cannot fulfil this vital function if not built upon solid rock. Both peaceful uses and disarmament require a foundation of nonproliferation assurances if they are to produce for mankind the prosperity and safety envisioned in the NPT. The potential power of nuclear technology is such that the widespread sharing of nuclear materials and know-how would be neither safe nor sane if one could not rely upon sound assurances that these things would not be lost, stolen, or misappropriated for non-peaceful purposes. And today’s weapons possessors would surely never agree to relinquish their own nuclear arsenals were they not confident that other states would not thereafter build such weapons themselves. Both of those two “pillars” thus are neither coequal with nor do they compete with nonproliferation. In truth, they depend upon nonproliferation. This is not to dismiss the importance of peaceful uses, nor of disarmament. To the contrary, they are of enormous importance, and it is in part precisely for the benefits these aspects of the Treaty provide that we should all prize and preserve the integrity of the nonproliferation regime. But we should also not confuse ourselves about the relationship between these elements, because in misdiagnosing this relationship we could squander the chance to preserve the nonproliferation foundation upon which everything depends. II. An NPT Agenda for 2020 So with that preface, let me briefly outline the U.S. diplomatic agenda as we approach the 2020 Review Conference. Our agenda begins with reaffirming the centrality of nonproliferation and the importance of preserving the integrity of the nonproliferation regime — not only for the security benefits that nonproliferation provides to all (and perhaps especially states in the developing world) by helping preclude neighbors and rivals from developing nuclear weapons, but also because nonproliferation is a sine qua non enabler for peaceful nuclear sharing and for disarmament progress. If they cannot rest upon a solid foundation of nonproliferation assurances, as I have noted, these two critical projects will collapse. So our message is one of strengthening nonproliferation for all these reasons. This means, first and foremost, vigorous and resolute international cooperation to resolve the two biggest challenges facing the nonproliferation regime today: (1) bringing about the final and fully verified denuclearization of North Korea; and (2) finally ensuring that Iran never again has any pathway to a nuclear weapon. Remembering the way that these two countries’ illicit nuclear weapons programs have so profoundly destabilized two critical regions of the world, moreover, we must take steps to make it more difficult for countries caught in violation of the NPT to exercise the option of withdrawing from it — as North Korea did — to continue such programs. We must also work tirelessly to strengthen the system of nuclear safeguards that are essential for credible nonproliferation assurances. This means ensuring that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has the resources and authorities it needs, and that it is both willing and able to exercise these authorities by following any and all credible information wherever the evidentiary trail may lead. We must ensure universal adherence to the IAEA Additional Protocol as the global safeguards standard, and promote universal adherence to nuclear safety and security best practices. But precisely because we remain firmly committed not only to the success of the nonproliferation regime in itself, but also to disarmament and to sharing the benefits of nuclear technology, we cannot leave it at that. Accordingly, our NPT diplomacy also aims to highlight, promote, and accelerate peaceful nuclear uses worldwide — both in the generation of nuclear power and in the full range of health, industrial, medical, agricultural, and research applications that are facilitated by nuclear science, as I outlined in my remarks to the IAEA Ministerial on Science and Technology on November 28. As for the important global project of trying to advance toward a world safely and sustainably free of nuclear weapons, as I outlined at Wilton Park two days ago on December 10, we have embarked upon an important new initiative to build a structured multilateral dialogue dedicated to ameliorating those conditions in the security environment that presently make it so difficult to achieve further disarmament progress. In sharp contrast to the counterproductive and magical thinking represented by the so-called nuclear weapons “Ban” treaty, our new initiative is based upon common sense, and upon our experience in achieving the extraordinary disarmament progress the world has seen since the end of the Cold War. Just as it took the waning of Cold War tensions to make possible the dramatic reductions that have occurred in the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals over the last three decades — reductions in which we ourselves in the United States, for instance, have cut back our arsenal by about 88 percent from its Cold War peak — one cannot expect to see the achievement of a nuclear weapons-free world without ameliorating those conditions in the regional and global security environments that still make the acquisition of nuclear weapons so attractive to some, and the idea of relinquishing them so alarming to others. So we have launched a new, global dialogue aimed at finding ways to do this — aiming, as the Preamble to the NPT itself exhorts us, to ease tensions and strengthen trust between states in order to facilitate disarmament. As I outlined at Wilton Park, as part of our expanding initiative to foster conditions amenable to more nuclear disarmament progress, we are launching a new structured dialogue to bring together participating states to explore solutions to key practical challenges that stand in the way of achieving a nuclear weapons-free world. This is an exciting new effort, and — as an example of our genuine commitment to disarmament progress — we hope to have this structured dialogue in full swing before the 2020 Review Conference. It is our earnest hope that our historical cousins in the United Kingdom will stand side-by-side with us in this important endeavor. III. Conclusion I am grateful for the chance to outline these U.S. perspectives and priorities to you as we think about how our two great nations can best work together to strengthen the NPT in all its aspects. Thank you for listening. The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein. Arms Control and International Security: To Walk the Earth in Safety 17th Edition: U.S. Global Leadership in Landmine Clearance and Conventional Weapons Destruction 12/18/2018 You are subscribed to Arms Control and International Security for U.S. Department of State. This information has recently been updated, and is now available. Arms Control and International Security: To Walk the Earth in Safety 17th Edition: U.S. Global Leadership in Landmine Clearance and Conventional Weapons Destruction 12/18/2018 12:18 PM EST Fact Sheet Office of the Spokesperson Washington, DC December 18, 2018 The United States is the world’s single largest financial supporter of efforts to address humanitarian hazards from landmines and unexploded ordnance in post-conflict countries and to reduce the availability of excess, loosely-secured, or otherwise at-risk weapons and munitions. Today’s release of the 17th edition of To Walk the Earth in Safety, the Department of State’s annual report summarizing the accomplishments of the U.S. Conventional Weapons Destruction Program, highlights our enduring commitment to making post-conflict communities safer and setting the stage for their recovery and development. Since 1993, the United States has invested more than $3.2 billion for the securing and safe disposal of excess small arms, light weapons, and munitions as well as the safe clearance of landmines and explosive remnants of war in more than 100 countries, making the United States the world’s single largest financial supporter of conventional weapons destruction. The United States has funded programs worldwide aimed at reducing at-risk weapons and munitions and improving stockpile security in order to prevent diversion of arms to terrorists and other destabilizing actors. Through the conventional weapons destruction program, the U.S. government has collaborated with partner nations and international organizations since 2003 to destroy more than 39,000 excess or poorly-secured man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), shoulder-fired missiles that pose a serious potential threat to global aviation in the hands of terrorists or insurgents. Working in close cooperation with the Department of Defense and the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Leahy War Victims Fund, the Department of State has helped numerous countries to declare themselves mine free. Proactive community outreach through our Mine Risk Education programs have prevented countless injuries while U.S.-funded Survivor Assistance has provided essential medical and rehabilitation services to people injured by landmines and unexploded ordnance. For additional information or to request a printed copy of To Walk the Earth in Safety, please contact the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Congressional and Public Affairs, at pm-cpa@state.gov, and follow us on Twitter @StateDeptPM. The report is also available on the Department of State website at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/walkearth/index.htm. The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein. Arms Control and International Security: To Walk the Earth in Safety:  New Report Showcases U.S. Global Leadership in Landmine Clearance and Conventional Weapons Destruction 12/18/2018 You are subscribed to Arms Control and International Security for U.S. Department of State. This information has recently been updated, and is now available. Arms Control and International Security: To Walk the Earth in Safety:  New Report Showcases U.S. Global Leadership in Landmine Clearance and Conventional Weapons Destruction 12/18/2018 12:16 PM EST Media Note Office of the Spokesperson Washington, DC December 18, 2018 The Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs has released the 17th Edition of To Walk the Earth in Safety, a report underscoring the accomplishments of the U.S. Conventional Weapons Destruction Program. For more than 20 years, the United States has led the international donor community in promoting peace and security worldwide by partnering with nations to reduce the availability of excess, loosely-secured, or otherwise at-risk small arms and light weapons and munitions, as well as to address humanitarian hazards from landmines and unexploded ordnance in post-conflict countries. The United States is the world’s single largest financial supporter of conventional weapons destruction, investing over $3.2 billion in more than 100 countries since 1993. In 2017, the Department of State funded and managed conventional weapons destruction programs in 47 countries. Our efforts – those of the United States government and all of our global partners – are crucial to building a more safe, secure and prosperous world. Thanks to strong bipartisan funding support from Congress, the Department of State looks forward to continuing this important work with other donor countries, those impacted by conflict, and the brave men and women working in the field to secure at-risk weapons and munitions and clear landmines and other explosive hazards. For more information or to request a printed copy of To Walk the Earth in Safety, please contact the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Office of Congressional and Public Affairs, at pm-cpa@state.gov, and follow us on Twitter @StateDeptPM. The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein. Europe and Eurasia: Remarks at Saints Cyril and Methodius University 12/18/2018 You are subscribed to Europe and Eurasia for U.S. Department of State. This information has recently been updated, and is now available. Europe and Eurasia: Remarks at Saints Cyril and Methodius University 12/18/2018 12:52 PM EST Remarks John J. Sullivan Skopje, Macedonia December 18, 2018 DEPUTY SECRETARY SULLIVAN: Thank you, Dr. Jankulovski, for that kind introduction and I apologize for my premature entrance onto the stage. Good afternoon everyone. I am delighted to be here in Skopje today, and I am especially honored to be at the Saints Cyril and Methodius University’s Faculty of Law, which I understand is Macedonia’s largest university. We stand here today at a very important moment in Macedonia’s history, as its people have chosen to confirm the country’s bonds with the West. As Prime Minister Zaev and I discussed this morning, the Prespa Agreement with Greece was a tough compromise that took time, patience, and courageous leadership. The two countries reached a compromise to advance the strategic goals of greater stability and prosperity in the region – goals that I know your friends in America and Europe share. As with any compromise, both sides feel that something is lost, and I do understand that some feel this very deeply. We also know that it is not yet a done deal – as members of Parliament told me today, there are still several steps before the agreement comes into force. Nonetheless, the United States looks forward to soon welcoming Macedonia as our 30th Ally in NATO as the Republic of North Macedonia. The decision to enter NATO is a sovereign choice of the people of Macedonia. We enthusiastically support that choice. The future of this country is bright. Macedonia stands on the brink of realizing a dream over two decades in the making. How this unfolds is up to you and your fellow countrymen and women, but the United States stands ready to help as you prepare to change the course of your nation’s history. The world, as you all know, has changed dramatically in the last 20 years. Great power conflict has returned to center stage – some would say that it never really left – and Macedonia finds itself targeted by Russian efforts to undermine its independence and thwart the democratic choice of the citizens of Macedonia and citizens of other nations in the region who believe their future lies with the West. In addition, we continue to face threats from terrorism, as well as bad actors who want to disrupt and de-stabilize democratic systems. To defeat them, we need strong nations, with firm democratic foundations, free media, and vibrant, open markets. Realizing this vision requires that citizens take pride in building strong institutions; and that they demand accountability and transparency from those institutions. It means that citizens refuse to look the other way when they see corruption and abuse. It means no longer shrugging one’s shoulders and accepting things as the “way they are” in the face of nepotism or cronyism. Today, Macedonia is an example of cooperation and political courage. Macedonia can be a leader in the Balkans and act as a regional mediator in other conflicts. We already see Macedonia shouldering its share of the burden of our collective security. Macedonia is a strong partner in the Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Our soldiers courageously fought alongside each other in Iraq, and continue to do so in Afghanistan. In the last year, over 600 U.S. and NATO troops have trained in Macedonia at the Krivolak Training Area. And, next year, over 1,000 U.S. troops will participate in exercises with Macedonian troops here at Krivolak. Indeed, this week, we celebrate the 25th anniversary of the State Partnership Program between the Vermont National Guard and the Army of the Republic of Macedonia. We thank Macedonia’s soldiers for their contributions and commitment to meeting our common challenges. Now, let me return again to Russia for a moment, as countering its malign influence has been a major focus of my trip to the region. Russia’s aggressive actions seek to undermine Western values of freedom and democracy. Russia’s goal is to impede the national sovereignty of countries on its Western borders. Russia is no friend of small nations; its vision is neo-imperialistic. Russia has suppressed opposition voices at home and sought to weaken democratic institutions across Europe. As we saw in the Kerch Strait, Russia continues to violate the sovereignty and integrity of Ukraine and Georgia. Moscow is attempting to deny Macedonia’s right to determine its own future, in this case by opposing the choice the people of Macedonia have made to join NATO. In stark contrast, the United States stands shoulder-to-shoulder with Macedonia, in support of its citizens’ sovereign determination to pursue a path that leads to the West. Happily, our goals align with yours. We want what you want, and we look forward to watching you – the next generation of leaders – build upon the hard work of your predecessors in the pursuit of security, peace, and prosperity for your country. Now, as I close, I would like to hear directly from you about the opportunity you have in front of you, to realize a more prosperous future for Macedonia. You will make this country stronger – a place where smart, hardworking young people can build a bright future. And a stronger Macedonia makes for a stronger Western Balkans, a stronger Europe, and a stronger Western Alliance. So I thank you for letting me come here and speak with you today. I want to keep these remarks short so we can have an exchange, a dialogue, and talk about questions that are of interest to you. So I will conclude these remarks and I look forward to having a conversation with you now. Thank you. The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein. Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor: Public Designation of Goran Radosavljevic Under Section 7031(c) of the FY 2018 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act 12/18/2018 You are subscribed to Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor for U.S. Department of State. This information has recently been updated, and is now available. Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor: Public Designation of Goran Radosavljevic Under Section 7031(c) of the FY 2018 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act 12/18/2018 05:42 PM EST Media Note Office of the Spokesperson Washington, DC December 18, 2018 The Department is publicly designating Goran Radosavljevic of Serbia under Section 7031(c) of the FY 2018 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Act, due to his involvement in gross violations of human rights. Section 7031(c) provides that, in cases where the Secretary of State has credible information that foreign officials have been involved in significant corruption or a gross violation of human rights, those individuals and their immediate family members are ineligible for entry into the United States. Radsosavljevic was credibly implicated in the 1999 murder of the Bytyqi brothers, three Albanian-American brothers killed in Serbia after the Kosovo War. The law also requires the Secretary of State to publicly or privately designate such officials and their family members. In addition to the designation of Mr. Radosavljevic, the Department is also publicly designating Mr. Radosavljevic’s spouse, Svetlana Radosavljevic, and his daughter, Ana Radosavljevic. For more information, please contact DRL-Press@state.gov. The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein. Speeches: Remarks at a Dinner Reception in Honor of Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali of Nepal 12/19/2018 You are subscribed to Speeches, Remarks, Testimony (other than by the Secretary) for U.S. Department of State. This information has recently been updated, and is now available. Speeches: Remarks at a Dinner Reception in Honor of Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali of Nepal 12/19/2018 09:29 AM EST Remarks Alice G. Wells Washington, DC December 18, 2018 Good evening. Namaste. Thank you Ambassador Karki and Mrs. Thakuri for hosting this lovely reception. Foreign Minister Gyawali, Foreign Secretary Bairagi, members of your visiting delegation, distinguished guests and friends: It is my honor to join you tonight in celebrating U.S.-Nepal ties. And I am delighted to be joined by our Ambassador in Kathmandu, Randy Berry, as well as by other senior representatives from the State Department, National Security Council, Department of Defense, Millennium Challenge Corporation, USAID, and other agencies. The broad U.S. government representation here tonight, along with members of civil society and the business community, demonstrates the depth of the friendship between our countries and the breadth of our partnership. Just a few hours ago, Secretary Pompeo and Foreign Minister Gyawali met at the Department of State and reaffirmed our strong respective commitments to the U.S.-Nepal partnership. They discussed new ways to advance our mutual interests through closer cooperation. This historic meeting opened a new chapter in the story of our friendship. America’s commitment to Nepal has been steadfast for over seven decades. We stood alongside the people of Nepal on their journey toward democracy, and the American people have made possible decades of support for Nepal’s economic development. Today, we continue to stand by Nepal in support of economic reforms that will increase living standards, attract U.S. investment, and lead to enduring prosperity. The United States has a profound stake in the success of your country. Nepal occupies a special place in an Indo-Pacific region that is, and must remain, stable, free, open, and prosperous. By working more closely together, we can effectively tackle shared challenges and bolster linkages across the region for the benefit of all. That is the basis of the proposed $500 million Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact, which will expand Nepal’s electricity infrastructure and improve its road networks. Underpinning the partnership between our two governments, of course, is the affection and goodwill our citizens have for one another. Our people-to-people ties have never been stronger. This past year, Nepal was the South Asian country with the largest increase in students choosing to pursue their higher studies in the United States. With a 14 percent increase from the previous year, there are now over 13,000 Nepalis enrolled in U.S. higher education institutions. The American people also have an abiding admiration for Nepal’s extraordinary cultural heritage as demonstrated by the contribution of nearly $3.5 million to preserve important Nepali landmarks through the Ambassador’s Fund for Cultural Preservation. So tonight, on the occasion of Foreign Minister Gyawali’s official visit to Washington, let me once more welcome this new opportunity to deepen the strong and enduring relationship between our countries—and wish the Foreign Minister success during the remainder of his visit. The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein. Secretary's Remarks: Bulgaria's Defense Modernization 12/19/2018 You are subscribed to Secretary's Remarks for U.S. Department of State. This information has recently been updated, and is now available. Secretary's Remarks: Bulgaria's Defense Modernization 12/19/2018 12:11 PM EST Press Statement Michael R. Pompeo Washington, DC December 19, 2018 The United States welcomes Bulgaria’s defense modernization plans and looks forward to the country’s imminent selection of a new multirole fighter aircraft. As I emphasized during my phone call with Prime Minister Boyko Borissov on December 18, and as Deputy Secretary Sullivan underlined during his visit to Sofia last weekend, the United States is committed to working with the Bulgarian government to tailor the final scope of a potential F-16 sale to fit its budgetary and operational requirements, while still offering superior capabilities. The United States has provided more than $200 million in security assistance to Bulgaria over the last 25 years to increase military professionalization and NATO interoperability. The United States has also invested more than $100 million in upgrades to the Novo Selo Training Center and Graf Ignatievo air base as part of the European Deterrence Initiative, and plans to continue such upgrades in the future. The United States will continue to prioritize investments with Bulgaria that build NATO interoperability. The United States looks forward to completing final negotiations with the Bulgarian government. The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein. Europe and Eurasia: Bulgaria's Defense Modernization 12/19/2018 You are subscribed to Europe and Eurasia for U.S. Department of State. This information has recently been updated, and is now available. Europe and Eurasia: Bulgaria's Defense Modernization 12/19/2018 12:11 PM EST Press Statement Michael R. Pompeo Washington, DC December 19, 2018 The United States welcomes Bulgaria’s defense modernization plans and looks forward to the country’s imminent selection of a new multirole fighter aircraft. As I emphasized during my phone call with Prime Minister Boyko Borissov on December 18, and as Deputy Secretary Sullivan underlined during his visit to Sofia last weekend, the United States is committed to working with the Bulgarian government to tailor the final scope of a potential F-16 sale to fit its budgetary and operational requirements, while still offering superior capabilities. The United States has provided more than $200 million in security assistance to Bulgaria over the last 25 years to increase military professionalization and NATO interoperability. The United States has also invested more than $100 million in upgrades to the Novo Selo Training Center and Graf Ignatievo air base as part of the European Deterrence Initiative, and plans to continue such upgrades in the future. The United States will continue to prioritize investments with Bulgaria that build NATO interoperability. The United States looks forward to completing final negotiations with the Bulgarian government. The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein. Speeches: Nonproliferation Policy and Priorities: A United States Perspective 12/20/2018 You are subscribed to Speeches, Remarks, Testimony (other than by the Secretary) for U.S. Department of State. This information has recently been updated, and is now available. Speeches: Nonproliferation Policy and Priorities: A United States Perspective 12/20/2018 08:20 AM EST Remarks Dr. Christopher Ashley Ford 7th European Union Nonproliferation and Disarmament Conference Brussels, Belgium December 18, 2018 Good day, everyone, and thank you for the chance to share the U.S perspective on the challenges and opportunities that confront us in the nonproliferation arena. A year ago at this European Union conference, I had the honor of speaking on behalf of the new U.S. Administration to outline our emerging approaches to nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament policy — summarizing critical continuities and highlighting constructive innovations that we were then getting underway in our first year. This year, having moved from the National Security Council staff to the State Department, I’m pleased to be able to outline our policy and priorities in the nonproliferation business. I appreciate this opportunity to share our views, because so much of this work depends upon partnerships with states around the world — including many of you represented here today — and it’s critical that we understand each other as we work together to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), delivery systems, and advanced conventional weapons, and to meet other security challenges worldwide. I. Core Missions First and most obviously, we remain committed to fulfilling core responsibilities in strengthening the global nonproliferation regime, helping partners improve their contributions to this regime, interdicting transactions of proliferation concern and impeding progress on state and non-state actor threat programs, preventing nuclear smuggling, advancing nuclear safety and security, and ensuring that the strongest possible nonproliferation protections are built into the civil-nuclear cooperation agreements we make with foreign partners. But we are certainly not simply continuing with inherited, baseline levels of activity in these core areas. We are trying to step up our game, such as by reforming how we manage the approximately $250 million my bureau administers in nonproliferation programming, moving it from a system of stove-piped, country-specific allocations to a regionally or globally threat-prioritized approach that will help us ensure that the marginal nonproliferation dollar is always being spent upon the most important as-yet unmet need. Still less than a year and a half after the passage of the toughest nonproliferation sanctions ever imposed by the U.N. Security Council — against North Korea — we have also been stepping up our capacity-building work with partner states in cooperative efforts to choke off the revenue sources the DPRK regime uses to support its WMD and missile programs. We are also stepping up our work in the nuclear security arena, in order to help the Nuclear Security Contact Group and the Nuclear Security Division at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) live up to their potential, and to ensure that nuclear security best practices continue to facilitate sharing the benefits of nuclear technology worldwide. We are also accelerating our Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) diplomacy in anticipation of the 2020 NPT Review Conference — an event which will have special political and symbolic significance on account of that year being the 50th anniversary of the Treaty’s entry into force. This anniversary should highlight for everyone the importance of shoring up the nonproliferation regime against the many challenges it faces, and we are continuing to prioritize doing this critical work. This is important not only because of the intrinsic security benefits that the nonproliferation regime provides to all states by preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons and its attendant risks of instability and nuclear warfare, but also because the global system of nuclear technology cooperation — a system that has brought all mankind so many benefits for so long, especially in the developing world — depends upon the solid foundation of assurances that the nonproliferation regime provides. We are highlighting our support for peaceful sharing of nuclear technology in order to remind other states of this critical connection, and of the central importance of nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear safety, and nuclear security as enablers for the continued worldwide spread of these benefits. II. The Biggest Challenges Most dramatically, we have accelerated diplomatic efforts to solve the two most dangerous threats to the global nonproliferation regime — the DPRK nuclear and missile advancements and the proliferation challenges presented by Iran. With our continuing pressure campaign against North Korea, coupled with diplomatic outreach to the regime in Pyongyang in order to ensure it implements its commitment to denuclearize, we are engaged in the boldest and most promising effort yet undertaken to solve a proliferation crisis that has been building there for decades. And with our imposition of the toughest U.S. sanctions ever imposed upon Iran, we are also setting the stage for a diplomatic process that can resolve the crisis created by Iran’s extraordinary range of malign acts in the Middle East and beyond. This is a very ambitious nonproliferation agenda, for in effect, we are trying simultaneously to pressure and to negotiate comprehensive solutions with two rogue regimes at the same time. But this very ambitiousness is a strength, not a weakness, and it will continue to provide us with opportunities to work together with likeminded partners in order finally to solve these problems and thereby save the global nonproliferation regime. Since I am addressing you here at the center of the European Union, let me say an additional word about Iran. From the perspective of U.S. policy, it has certainly been a big year, proceeding from our negotiations with E3 partners over the so-called “sunset provisions” of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal, to the cessation of U.S. participation in the JCPOA in May, and most recently to our re-imposition of nuclear-related sanctions lifted or waived under the JCPOA. I do understand that this has caused some tension with some of your governments. Our moves were necessary ones that will help set us all up for a more comprehensive and enduring successor agreement, however, and I am pleased that we are now back in regular contact and coordination with our European colleagues in responding to the many threats Iran presents. We and our European friends have had what I see as fundamentally tactical disagreements about precisely how — and when — to take action to curtail these threats, and especially how to address the danger that Iran will expand its nuclear capabilities and thereby shorten the “breakout time” needed to build a nuclear weapon. But we do not disagree on the goal of bringing about an Iran forever unable to develop nuclear weapons, an Iran that does not torment its region with proxy adventurism, an Iran that does not support terrorism around the globe, and an Iran that does not produce destabilizing missiles and send missile technology to terrorists and militia groups around the Middle East. On those key objectives we are in emphatic strategic agreement on both sides of the Atlantic, and it is gratifying that we are now back to working together closely on how to bring these things about. III. A New Strategic Orientation But I also want to draw your attention to a new and expanding aspect of our work: our contribution to how the United States and likeminded partners around the world are able to cope with the competitive strategies advanced by China and Russia. As we made clear in our National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, the United States is steadfastly committed to upholding the existing international order against the revisionist powers of the Eurasian landmass. This is not traditionally thought of as an area of focus for the portions of the U.S. national security and foreign policy bureaucracy in which I work, but as experts in nonproliferation, counterproliferation, national security technology controls, and sanctions enforcement, we really do have a great deal to contribute. We implement sanctions, for instance, not just to punish Russia’s use of chemical weapons in the United Kingdom but also to deter worldwide engagement with Moscow’s arms industry and intelligence sector. So far, we have been having a good deal of real success in this, already having effectively turned off several billion dollars’ worth of Russian arms transactions. Moreover, U.S. experience in working against national security threats presented by transfers of technology equips us to draw attention to the ways in which technology transfers to China can undercut economic competitiveness globally, and contribute to Beijing’s destabilizing military buildup. While the effects of