U.S. Department of State Weekly Digest Bulletin

More

2 of 3

U.S. Department of State Weekly Digest Bulletin Inbox x U.S. Department of State <usstatebpa@public.govdelivery.com> Nov 25, 2018, 6:58 PM (2 days ago)  to me Secretary's Remarks: Launch of the Humanitarian Assistance Steering Council  11/13/2018 You are subscribed to Secretary's Remarks for U.S. Department of State. This information has recently been updated, and is now available. Secretary's Remarks: Launch of the Humanitarian Assistance Steering Council  11/13/2018 10:05 AM EST Press Statement Michael R. Pompeo Washington, DC November 13, 2018 In order to further optimize the State Department and USAID’s humanitarian assistance, I have established a new senior-level mechanism for coordinating and overseeing U.S. humanitarian assistance – the Humanitarian Assistance Steering Council. The purpose of the Council is to coordinate U.S. government efforts in order to achieve seamless, efficient, and effective delivery of humanitarian assistance overseas in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives, including promoting burden-sharing and UN humanitarian reform. The State Department, through the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, as well as USAID, through the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, have vital and complementary roles to play in the development and implementation of U.S. humanitarian assistance. The Council’s establishment will improve oversight and accountability across the two organizations while supporting their distinct and important functions. Ambassador Nathan A. Sales, with his delegated authorities of the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, and Rear Admiral Tim Ziemer, head of the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, will co-lead the Council at the outset. Other members will include senior leaders from the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources, the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, and USAID’s Bureau for Policy, Planning, and Learning. The Council will provide important leadership and coordination to maintain the United States’ proud tradition of responding to conflicts, other complex emergencies, and natural disasters while equipping the United States to improve the impact and results of our humanitarian assistance. Promoting burden-sharing by other donors will be an important focus for the Council. Despite significant U.S. and other donor contributions, the gap between needs and available resources continues to grow, which is why it is critical that we redouble our efforts to improve efficiency and increase donor contributions in order to promote sustainable solutions for those in need. The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein. Secretary's Remarks: Angola National Day 11/13/2018 You are subscribed to Secretary's Remarks for U.S. Department of State. This information has recently been updated, and is now available. Secretary's Remarks: Angola National Day 11/12/2018 06:39 PM EST Press Statement Michael R. Pompeo Washington, DC November 12, 2018 On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I extend my warmest regards to the people of Angola as you celebrate 43 years of independence on November 11. Angola has taken bold steps to strengthen its democracy and grow its economy in the past year. As a strategic partner and friend, the United States remains committed to supporting Angola’s remarkable steps toward transparency, democracy, and regional leadership. We are convinced that a prosperous and engaged Angola will benefit the region and the world. I wish all Angolans a joyful day of celebrating your independence. The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein. Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor: Launch of the Humanitarian Assistance Steering Council  11/13/2018 You are subscribed to Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor for U.S. Department of State. This information has recently been updated, and is now available. Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor: Launch of the Humanitarian Assistance Steering Council  11/13/2018 10:05 AM EST Press Statement Michael R. Pompeo Washington, DC November 13, 2018 In order to further optimize the State Department and USAID’s humanitarian assistance, I have established a new senior-level mechanism for coordinating and overseeing U.S. humanitarian assistance – the Humanitarian Assistance Steering Council. The purpose of the Council is to coordinate U.S. government efforts in order to achieve seamless, efficient, and effective delivery of humanitarian assistance overseas in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives, including promoting burden-sharing and UN humanitarian reform. The State Department, through the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, as well as USAID, through the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, have vital and complementary roles to play in the development and implementation of U.S. humanitarian assistance. The Council’s establishment will improve oversight and accountability across the two organizations while supporting their distinct and important functions. Ambassador Nathan A. Sales, with his delegated authorities of the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, and Rear Admiral Tim Ziemer, head of the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, will co-lead the Council at the outset. Other members will include senior leaders from the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources, the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, and USAID’s Bureau for Policy, Planning, and Learning. The Council will provide important leadership and coordination to maintain the United States’ proud tradition of responding to conflicts, other complex emergencies, and natural disasters while equipping the United States to improve the impact and results of our humanitarian assistance. Promoting burden-sharing by other donors will be an important focus for the Council. Despite significant U.S. and other donor contributions, the gap between needs and available resources continues to grow, which is why it is critical that we redouble our efforts to improve efficiency and increase donor contributions in order to promote sustainable solutions for those in need. The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein. Counterterrorism: Countering Iran's Global Terrorism 11/13/2018 You are subscribed to Counterterrorism for U.S. Department of State. This information has recently been updated, and is now available. Counterterrorism: Countering Iran's Global Terrorism 11/13/2018 02:32 PM EST Remarks Nathan A. Sales Washington Institute for Near East Policy Counterterrorism Lecture Series Washington, DC November 13, 2018 Thanks for that warm introduction and for hosting me here. It’s a real pleasure to participate in the Washington Institute’s Counterterrorism Lecture Series. A number of my predecessors from the CT Bureau have had the privilege of speaking at this lectern, and I’m honored to be here to keep the streak alive. Today, I’m going to highlight the United States’ concerns about ongoing terrorism by the Iranian regime and its proxies around the world. Then I’ll tell you what the Trump Administration is doing to counter this global and growing threat. Iran is the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism. Period. It has held that dubious distinction for many years now and shows no sign of relinquishing the title. To the contrary, the regime in Tehran continues to provide hundreds of millions of dollars every year to terrorists across the world. It does this, despite ongoing economic turmoil that’s impoverishing many of its people. The beneficiaries of this misbegotten largesse range from Hizballah in Lebanon, to Hamas in Gaza, to violent rejectionist groups in the West Bank, to the Houthis in Yemen, to hostile militias in Iraq and Syria. Let me give you some numbers. This may sound hard to believe, but Iran provides Hizballah alone some $700 million a year. It gives another $100 million to various Palestinian terrorist groups. When you throw in the money provided to other terrorists, the total comes close to one billion dollars. Let’s pause to consider that, because it bears repeating: The Iranian regime spends nearly a billion dollars a year just to support terrorism. I’d be tempted to make a Dr. Evil reference if the stakes weren’t so high. And who ultimately pays the price of this support? The Iranian people. The resources Iran uses to fund its global terrorist campaign come directly out of the pockets of ordinary Iranians. The regime robs its own citizens to pay its proxies abroad. Tehran’s priorities are clear. It doesn’t seek to boost economic growth at home, or to improve Iranian living standards. It doesn’t seek to reduce Iran’s growing unemployment. What the regime prioritizes, despite the country’s increasing economic distress, is buying guns and bombs for foreign terrorists. Tragically, this vast waste of the Iranian people’s assets has resulted in bloodshed and instability across the globe. Let me lay out what I mean. In Syria, Tehran has given massive military and financial assistance to the Assad regime, ensuring its survival and, not coincidentally, giving Tehran access to other parts of the Levant. Iran has built and backed new militia forces in Syria and Iraq. This cadre of battle-hardened fighters can serve as a loyal expeditionary force for the Iranian regime. We’ve seen first-hand in recent months how dangerous these proxies can be. Two months ago, Iranian-linked militias in Iraq launched rockets at our embassy in Baghdad and our consulate in Basra. Fortunately, no one was killed, but these attacks can leave no doubt about the regime’s support for violence. Iran is working constantly to undermine its neighbors in the Gulf. In Bahrain, Tehran has developed a close partnership with the al-Ashtar Brigades – an organization working to overthrow the Bahraini government. Iran provides al-Ashtar with training, funding, and weapons, enabling the group’s terrorist attacks. Farther afield, Iran sponsors terror through an elaborate network of allies, proxies, and cutouts. Tehran is the chief patron of Lebanese Hizballah, one of the world’s most capable and worrisome terrorist groups. Thanks to Iran’s backing, Hizballah has built a fearsome arsenal. The group now has more than 100,000 rockets in Lebanon, a massive and destabilizing build-up. Indifferent to the people it purports to defend, Hizballah hides its missile factories in population centers – effectively using innocent civilians as human shields. And while Hizballah likes to tout its political role and social services in Lebanon, that’s an ill-fitting fig leaf for its true and more nefarious agenda. Let’s be clear: Hizballah is not an NGO; it is not just another political party. Hizballah is a terrorist group with a bloody record of perpetrating violence and destruction in Lebanon and Syria, throughout the Middle East, and around the world. Hizballah’s ambitions and global reach rival those of al-Qa’ida and ISIS. In recent years, Hizballah operatives have been caught preparing attacks as far afield as Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Cyprus, Egypt, Peru, and Thailand. Hizballah weapons caches have been discovered in the Gulf, in Europe, in Asia, and in Africa. In 2012, Hizballah bombed a bus in Bulgaria, killing five Israeli tourists and one Bulgarian citizen. Iran isn’t content to merely fund proxies like Hizballah. The regime itself engages in terrorist plotting around the world. Just last month, an Iranian operative was arrested for planning assassinations in Denmark. This summer, authorities in Germany, Belgium, and France collaborated to thwart a plot to bomb a political rally near Paris. They arrested several Iranian operatives – including an Iranian spy operating under diplomatic cover in Austria. Ordinarily, the arrest of a purported diplomat for planning a terrorist attack would be unprecedented. For Iran, it’s business as usual. These plots were particularly brazen in their indifference to civilian casualties, in their abuse of diplomatic status, and in their general shamelessness. But they’re just the tip of the iceberg. For Iran has a long and sordid history of backing terrorism in Europe. In January, German authorities discovered and investigated ten suspected IRGC-Qods Force operatives. In March, Albania arrested two Iranian operatives for terrorist plotting. Several years ago, Germany arrested and subsequently convicted a Qods Force operative who was surveilling the head of a German-Israeli group and his associates. In 2012, Turkish authorities disrupted a plot by four Qods Force operatives to attack Israeli targets in Turkey. Iran was responsible for not one but two separate plots in Cyprus, in 2012 and in 2015. Iran is actively plotting terrorism in Europe, but it plots in lots of other places too. Africa, Southeast Asia, and South America have also seen Iran-backed terrorism in recent years. In 2013, three Iranian operatives were arrested in Nigeria for planning attacks against U.S. and Israeli tourist sites and organizations. The previous year, two Qods Force operatives were arrested in Kenya for plotting attacks against Western interests – and some 33 pounds of explosives were found in their possession. In South America, a senior Iranian diplomat – sound familiar? – was found to be planning an attack near the Israeli Embassy in Uruguay. And in Asia, since 2011, Iranian operatives have been implicated in plots and attacks in Nepal, India, and Pakistan. Our country is not immune. In 2011, the Qods Force allegedly was involved in a plan to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States at a restaurant in Georgetown. And just this past August, the FBI arrested two people for allegedly surveilling Bah’ai and Jewish facilities in the United States. They’re also suspected of collecting information about Americans who belong to an Iranian opposition group. All in all, an extraordinary compendium of evil. This is not the behavior of a normal government. This is the behavior of a lawless regime that uses terrorism as a basic tool of statecraft. We cannot let this threat go unanswered. And so the Trump Administration is responding. We’re going after Iranian support for terrorism in a variety of ways to get at the people and organizations Iran uses to spread terror. Last week, the United States re-imposed a range of sanctions on Iran that had been lifted with the signing of the flawed nuclear deal, as well as new sanctions on additional Iranian entities. Our actions included sanctions against Iran’s energy and shipping sectors, as well as the Iranian Central Bank. These new designations ramp up already intense pressure – pressure that’s designed to force Iran to act like a normal country. I can assure you that, until Iran changes its ways, more pressure is coming. And we will sustain that pressure until Iranian leaders cease their destructive behavior. Our campaign has been building for some time: Last year, the Administration took a major step to hold Iran accountable when the Treasury Department designated the IRGC as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, or SDGT, for its support to terrorism. The State Department likewise has been aggressively sanctioning Iranian-linked terrorists. In 2018, we designated al-Ashtar Brigades in Bahrain and several of its leaders. We also designated Harakat al Sabireen, an Iran-backed group operating in Gaza. This is just the beginning. We will continue to target Iran’s terrorist proxies. They will pay a price for their actions and their partnership with the regime in Tehran. At the same time, the Administration is ramping up our efforts against Hizballah. We’re using law enforcement and financial tools to disrupt its networks. We’re targeting its financial resources and squeezing it out of the international financial system. The U.S. government has designated over 150 entities and individuals tied to that terrorist group, including more than 40 in 2018 alone. I’ll give you a few examples that illustrate the breadth of Hizballah’s networks. Earlier this year, Treasury sanctioned a number of Hizballah front companies and facilitators in West Africa. These included fishing, car rentals, food processing – even pig farming. Yes, there’s a Hizballah pig farm in Liberia. We’re also using the Rewards for Justice program, or RFJ, to add to the pressure on Hizballah, offering multi-million dollar rewards for information leading to the identification or location of key leaders and operatives. Last year, the State Department issued RFJ reward offers for two Hizballah leaders – Talal Hamiyah and Fuad Shukr. These men have American blood on their hands. These were the first RFJs targeting Hizballah in more than a decade. Thanks to good intelligence, solid investigative work, and some luck, Iranian terrorist plotting has not – so far – resulted in the hundreds of casualties that Tehran is clearly trying to orchestrate. But counting on luck is not a winning strategy. We need to do more to change the Iranian regime’s calculus and end its support for terrorism. And we know that the United States cannot do this alone, which is why we’re pressing our international partners to stand up to Iran-backed terrorism. We also need the private sector to play a responsible role in this effort. I’ll be blunt: If you’re doing business with Iran, you’re funding terrorism. The IRGC has penetrated nearly every sector of the Iranian economy. By enriching the IRGC, companies are, even if inadvertently, enabling Tehran’s terrorist agenda. This has to stop. All of us can do more. All of us must do more. Therefore, today, I am announcing several significant new measures the Trump Administration is taking to constrain Iran and its proxies. To begin with – and this will not be a surprise – the State Department’s mandatory five-year review of Hizballah has once again determined that the group must and will remain on our list of designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. This means all of Hizballah. We reject the false distinction between Hizballah’s terrorist wing and a purportedly peaceful “political wing.” Hizballah is one organization. It is a terrorist organization, root and branch. The State Department is also levying two new terrorism designations today. First, we’re sanctioning Jawad Nasrallah as an SDGT. Jawad Nasrallah is a Hizballah leader and the son of the group’s Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah. In 2016, Jawad tried to activate a suicide bombing and shooting cell based in the West Bank. Fortunately, security forces arrested the five people he had recruited for this operation. Second, we’re designating the Al-Mujahidin Brigades, or AMB. Based in the Gaza Strip, the AMB is a military organization that has operated in the Palestinian Territories since 2005. Its members have long plotted attacks against Israeli targets. AMB has ties to Hizballah, and Hizballah has provided funding and military training to AMB members. Along with these actions by the State Department, earlier today the Treasury Department announced four designations targeting Iranian and Hizballah-linked terrorists in Iraq. First, Treasury is sanctioning Shibl Al-Zaydi as a SDGT. Al-Zaydi has served as a financial coordinator between the Qods Force and Shi’a militias in Iraq. He’s also facilitated Iraqi investments on behalf of Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Qods Force. Al-Zaydi has helped smuggle oil for Iran, and has sent Iraqi fighters to Syria allegedly at the request of the Qods Force. In addition, Treasury is designating Yusuf Hashim. Hashim oversees all Hizballah-related operations in Iraq and is in charge of protecting Hizballah’s interests in that country. Treasury is also designating Muhamad Farhat. Farhat has advised militias in Iraq on behalf of Hizballah. He was also tasked with collecting security and intelligence information in Iraq for senior Hizballah and Iranian leadership. Lastly, Treasury is designating Adnan Kawtharani. Kawtharani facilitates business transactions for Hizballah inside Iraq and regularly meets there with militias and Hizballah officials. He has also helped secure funding for Hizballah, and has served as the right hand man for his brother and senior Hizballah member Muhammad Kawtharani – who himself was designated in 2013. There’s more to come. We’ll be making some additional announcements at the State Department’s press briefing later this afternoon. So stay tuned. The goal of the measures I’ve described today is very simple: to force a change in the Iranian regime’s behavior. We expect – we insist – that Iran follow the same rules every other country must follow and end its use of terrorism as a tool of statecraft. We will make clear to Iran-backed terrorists and to their masters in Tehran that there are costs – increasingly heavy ones – to their support for terrorist barbarism. We are prepared to impose those costs on the regime and its proxies wherever they may be. We know that this will be a long and difficult challenge. But we will prevail. We will continue to ratchet up the pressure until Iran comes to its senses, joins the community of civilized nations, and ends its support for murder and mayhem across the globe. We owe it to the victims, and we owe it to the cause of simple human decency. We can do no less. The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein. Speeches: Countering Iran's Global Terrorism 11/13/2018 You are subscribed to Speeches, Remarks, Testimony (other than by the Secretary) for U.S. Department of State. This information has recently been updated, and is now available. Speeches: Countering Iran's Global Terrorism 11/13/2018 02:32 PM EST Remarks Nathan A. Sales Washington Institute for Near East Policy Counterterrorism Lecture Series Washington, DC November 13, 2018 Thanks for that warm introduction and for hosting me here. It’s a real pleasure to participate in the Washington Institute’s Counterterrorism Lecture Series. A number of my predecessors from the CT Bureau have had the privilege of speaking at this lectern, and I’m honored to be here to keep the streak alive. Today, I’m going to highlight the United States’ concerns about ongoing terrorism by the Iranian regime and its proxies around the world. Then I’ll tell you what the Trump Administration is doing to counter this global and growing threat. Iran is the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism. Period. It has held that dubious distinction for many years now and shows no sign of relinquishing the title. To the contrary, the regime in Tehran continues to provide hundreds of millions of dollars every year to terrorists across the world. It does this, despite ongoing economic turmoil that’s impoverishing many of its people. The beneficiaries of this misbegotten largesse range from Hizballah in Lebanon, to Hamas in Gaza, to violent rejectionist groups in the West Bank, to the Houthis in Yemen, to hostile militias in Iraq and Syria. Let me give you some numbers. This may sound hard to believe, but Iran provides Hizballah alone some $700 million a year. It gives another $100 million to various Palestinian terrorist groups. When you throw in the money provided to other terrorists, the total comes close to one billion dollars. Let’s pause to consider that, because it bears repeating: The Iranian regime spends nearly a billion dollars a year just to support terrorism. I’d be tempted to make a Dr. Evil reference if the stakes weren’t so high. And who ultimately pays the price of this support? The Iranian people. The resources Iran uses to fund its global terrorist campaign come directly out of the pockets of ordinary Iranians. The regime robs its own citizens to pay its proxies abroad. Tehran’s priorities are clear. It doesn’t seek to boost economic growth at home, or to improve Iranian living standards. It doesn’t seek to reduce Iran’s growing unemployment. What the regime prioritizes, despite the country’s increasing economic distress, is buying guns and bombs for foreign terrorists. Tragically, this vast waste of the Iranian people’s assets has resulted in bloodshed and instability across the globe. Let me lay out what I mean. In Syria, Tehran has given massive military and financial assistance to the Assad regime, ensuring its survival and, not coincidentally, giving Tehran access to other parts of the Levant. Iran has built and backed new militia forces in Syria and Iraq. This cadre of battle-hardened fighters can serve as a loyal expeditionary force for the Iranian regime. We’ve seen first-hand in recent months how dangerous these proxies can be. Two months ago, Iranian-linked militias in Iraq launched rockets at our embassy in Baghdad and our consulate in Basra. Fortunately, no one was killed, but these attacks can leave no doubt about the regime’s support for violence. Iran is working constantly to undermine its neighbors in the Gulf. In Bahrain, Tehran has developed a close partnership with the al-Ashtar Brigades – an organization working to overthrow the Bahraini government. Iran provides al-Ashtar with training, funding, and weapons, enabling the group’s terrorist attacks. Farther afield, Iran sponsors terror through an elaborate network of allies, proxies, and cutouts. Tehran is the chief patron of Lebanese Hizballah, one of the world’s most capable and worrisome terrorist groups. Thanks to Iran’s backing, Hizballah has built a fearsome arsenal. The group now has more than 100,000 rockets in Lebanon, a massive and destabilizing build-up. Indifferent to the people it purports to defend, Hizballah hides its missile factories in population centers – effectively using innocent civilians as human shields. And while Hizballah likes to tout its political role and social services in Lebanon, that’s an ill-fitting fig leaf for its true and more nefarious agenda. Let’s be clear: Hizballah is not an NGO; it is not just another political party. Hizballah is a terrorist group with a bloody record of perpetrating violence and destruction in Lebanon and Syria, throughout the Middle East, and around the world. Hizballah’s ambitions and global reach rival those of al-Qa’ida and ISIS. In recent years, Hizballah operatives have been caught preparing attacks as far afield as Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Cyprus, Egypt, Peru, and Thailand. Hizballah weapons caches have been discovered in the Gulf, in Europe, in Asia, and in Africa. In 2012, Hizballah bombed a bus in Bulgaria, killing five Israeli tourists and one Bulgarian citizen. Iran isn’t content to merely fund proxies like Hizballah. The regime itself engages in terrorist plotting around the world. Just last month, an Iranian operative was arrested for planning assassinations in Denmark. This summer, authorities in Germany, Belgium, and France collaborated to thwart a plot to bomb a political rally near Paris. They arrested several Iranian operatives – including an Iranian spy operating under diplomatic cover in Austria. Ordinarily, the arrest of a purported diplomat for planning a terrorist attack would be unprecedented. For Iran, it’s business as usual. These plots were particularly brazen in their indifference to civilian casualties, in their abuse of diplomatic status, and in their general shamelessness. But they’re just the tip of the iceberg. For Iran has a long and sordid history of backing terrorism in Europe. In January, German authorities discovered and investigated ten suspected IRGC-Qods Force operatives. In March, Albania arrested two Iranian operatives for terrorist plotting. Several years ago, Germany arrested and subsequently convicted a Qods Force operative who was surveilling the head of a German-Israeli group and his associates. In 2012, Turkish authorities disrupted a plot by four Qods Force operatives to attack Israeli targets in Turkey. Iran was responsible for not one but two separate plots in Cyprus, in 2012 and in 2015. Iran is actively plotting terrorism in Europe, but it plots in lots of other places too. Africa, Southeast Asia, and South America have also seen Iran-backed terrorism in recent years. In 2013, three Iranian operatives were arrested in Nigeria for planning attacks against U.S. and Israeli tourist sites and organizations. The previous year, two Qods Force operatives were arrested in Kenya for plotting attacks against Western interests – and some 33 pounds of explosives were found in their possession. In South America, a senior Iranian diplomat – sound familiar? – was found to be planning an attack near the Israeli Embassy in Uruguay. And in Asia, since 2011, Iranian operatives have been implicated in plots and attacks in Nepal, India, and Pakistan. Our country is not immune. In 2011, the Qods Force allegedly was involved in a plan to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States at a restaurant in Georgetown. And just this past August, the FBI arrested two people for allegedly surveilling Bah’ai and Jewish facilities in the United States. They’re also suspected of collecting information about Americans who belong to an Iranian opposition group. All in all, an extraordinary compendium of evil. This is not the behavior of a normal government. This is the behavior of a lawless regime that uses terrorism as a basic tool of statecraft. We cannot let this threat go unanswered. And so the Trump Administration is responding. We’re going after Iranian support for terrorism in a variety of ways to get at the people and organizations Iran uses to spread terror. Last week, the United States re-imposed a range of sanctions on Iran that had been lifted with the signing of the flawed nuclear deal, as well as new sanctions on additional Iranian entities. Our actions included sanctions against Iran’s energy and shipping sectors, as well as the Iranian Central Bank. These new designations ramp up already intense pressure – pressure that’s designed to force Iran to act like a normal country. I can assure you that, until Iran changes its ways, more pressure is coming. And we will sustain that pressure until Iranian leaders cease their destructive behavior. Our campaign has been building for some time: Last year, the Administration took a major step to hold Iran accountable when the Treasury Department designated the IRGC as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, or SDGT, for its support to terrorism. The State Department likewise has been aggressively sanctioning Iranian-linked terrorists. In 2018, we designated al-Ashtar Brigades in Bahrain and several of its leaders. We also designated Harakat al Sabireen, an Iran-backed group operating in Gaza. This is just the beginning. We will continue to target Iran’s terrorist proxies. They will pay a price for their actions and their partnership with the regime in Tehran. At the same time, the Administration is ramping up our efforts against Hizballah. We’re using law enforcement and financial tools to disrupt its networks. We’re targeting its financial resources and squeezing it out of the international financial system. The U.S. government has designated over 150 entities and individuals tied to that terrorist group, including more than 40 in 2018 alone. I’ll give you a few examples that illustrate the breadth of Hizballah’s networks. Earlier this year, Treasury sanctioned a number of Hizballah front companies and facilitators in West Africa. These included fishing, car rentals, food processing – even pig farming. Yes, there’s a Hizballah pig farm in Liberia. We’re also using the Rewards for Justice program, or RFJ, to add to the pressure on Hizballah, offering multi-million dollar rewards for information leading to the identification or location of key leaders and operatives. Last year, the State Department issued RFJ reward offers for two Hizballah leaders – Talal Hamiyah and Fuad Shukr. These men have American blood on their hands. These were the first RFJs targeting Hizballah in more than a decade. Thanks to good intelligence, solid investigative work, and some luck, Iranian terrorist plotting has not – so far – resulted in the hundreds of casualties that Tehran is clearly trying to orchestrate. But counting on luck is not a winning strategy. We need to do more to change the Iranian regime’s calculus and end its support for terrorism. And we know that the United States cannot do this alone, which is why we’re pressing our international partners to stand up to Iran-backed terrorism. We also need the private sector to play a responsible role in this effort. I’ll be blunt: If you’re doing business with Iran, you’re funding terrorism. The IRGC has penetrated nearly every sector of the Iranian economy. By enriching the IRGC, companies are, even if inadvertently, enabling Tehran’s terrorist agenda. This has to stop. All of us can do more. All of us must do more. Therefore, today, I am announcing several significant new measures the Trump Administration is taking to constrain Iran and its proxies. To begin with – and this will not be a surprise – the State Department’s mandatory five-year review of Hizballah has once again determined that the group must and will remain on our list of designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. This means all of Hizballah. We reject the false distinction between Hizballah’s terrorist wing and a purportedly peaceful “political wing.” Hizballah is one organization. It is a terrorist organization, root and branch. The State Department is also levying two new terrorism designations today. First, we’re sanctioning Jawad Nasrallah as an SDGT. Jawad Nasrallah is a Hizballah leader and the son of the group’s Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah. In 2016, Jawad tried to activate a suicide bombing and shooting cell based in the West Bank. Fortunately, security forces arrested the five people he had recruited for this operation. Second, we’re designating the Al-Mujahidin Brigades, or AMB. Based in the Gaza Strip, the AMB is a military organization that has operated in the Palestinian Territories since 2005. Its members have long plotted attacks against Israeli targets. AMB has ties to Hizballah, and Hizballah has provided funding and military training to AMB members. Along with these actions by the State Department, earlier today the Treasury Department announced four designations targeting Iranian and Hizballah-linked terrorists in Iraq. First, Treasury is sanctioning Shibl Al-Zaydi as a SDGT. Al-Zaydi has served as a financial coordinator between the Qods Force and Shi’a militias in Iraq. He’s also facilitated Iraqi investments on behalf of Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Qods Force. Al-Zaydi has helped smuggle oil for Iran, and has sent Iraqi fighters to Syria allegedly at the request of the Qods Force. In addition, Treasury is designating Yusuf Hashim. Hashim oversees all Hizballah-related operations in Iraq and is in charge of protecting Hizballah’s interests in that country. Treasury is also designating Muhamad Farhat. Farhat has advised militias in Iraq on behalf of Hizballah. He was also tasked with collecting security and intelligence information in Iraq for senior Hizballah and Iranian leadership. Lastly, Treasury is designating Adnan Kawtharani. Kawtharani facilitates business transactions for Hizballah inside Iraq and regularly meets there with militias and Hizballah officials. He has also helped secure funding for Hizballah, and has served as the right hand man for his brother and senior Hizballah member Muhammad Kawtharani – who himself was designated in 2013. There’s more to come. We’ll be making some additional announcements at the State Department’s press briefing later this afternoon. So stay tuned. The goal of the measures I’ve described today is very simple: to force a change in the Iranian regime’s behavior. We expect – we insist – that Iran follow the same rules every other country must follow and end its use of terrorism as a tool of statecraft. We will make clear to Iran-backed terrorists and to their masters in Tehran that there are costs – increasingly heavy ones – to their support for terrorist barbarism. We are prepared to impose those costs on the regime and its proxies wherever they may be. We know that this will be a long and difficult challenge. But we will prevail. We will continue to ratchet up the pressure until Iran comes to its senses, joins the community of civilized nations, and ends its support for murder and mayhem across the globe. We owe it to the victims, and we owe it to the cause of simple human decency. We can do no less. The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein. Arms Control and International Security: Nonproliferation with Attitude: Counterproliferation Tools and Diplomacy in U.S. Foreign Policy 11/14/2018 You are subscribed to Arms Control and International Security for U.S. Department of State. This information has recently been updated, and is now available. Arms Control and International Security: Nonproliferation with Attitude: Counterproliferation Tools and Diplomacy in U.S. Foreign Policy 11/14/2018 02:48 PM EST Remarks Dr. Christopher Ashley Ford Heritage Foundation Washington, DC November 14, 2018 Good day, everyone. It’s a pleasure to be here, and I am grateful for the chance to speak to you about a vital facet of our work at the State Department that is sometimes overlooked: counterproliferation diplomacy. I. What is Counterproliferation? First, it’s useful to begin with definitions. I am sometimes asked what “counterproliferation” means, and how it differs from “nonproliferation.” In truth, there really isn’t an official definition, but let me give an informal answer: counterproliferation is a subcomponent of nonproliferation policy — a particularly proactive piece, or what I think of as “nonpro with attitude.” In this typology, traditional nonproliferation work involves creating and maintaining barriers to the flow of dangerous technologies into dangerous state or non-state hands, impeding transfer of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), WMD delivery systems, and advanced conventional weapons, and any items, materials, or know-how related thereto. In traditional nonproliferation policy, we work to prevent technology and material from getting into such hands by ensuring that effective institutions, legal authorities, and practices are in place that make it easier for responsible parties to detect and prevent such activity before it occurs. As I see it, however, counterproliferation — or “CP” — goes a step beyond just barrier-building. Whereas traditional nonproliferation seeks to lock down and prevent destabilizing movement of mankind’s most dangerous capabilities, counterproliferation directs itself against proliferation-related activities themselves. CP targets particular transfers for interdiction to ensure that they do not reach their intended destination, and it aims to disrupt and dismantle the networks of illicit merchants, brokers, shippers, transshippers, middlemen, financiers, and facilitators that organize and undertake such transfers. In one form or another, the United States has been engaging in CP work for a long time, but it really bloomed as a focus of U.S. foreign policy activity in the early 2000s — led by officials such as John Bolton when he was Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, and Bob Joseph, first at the National Security Council staff and then also as Undersecretary of State. CP is a top priority for the current administration as well. II. Tools of Counterproliferation The toolkit we use to disrupt proliferation-related transactions begins with good intelligence — and indeed the U.S. intelligence community (IC) has done a good job of building up its capabilities to inform and support CP priorities. Indeed, the U.S. interagency has developed effective mechanisms to partner with the IC, share information, and bring officials from a kaleidoscope of different departments and agencies together to work collaboratively on dynamic proliferation network targets in real time. A. National Tools At the State Department, we are intimately involved in such CP work, and we participate in the key interagency mechanisms and processes through which it is executed. As the lead department for diplomatic and foreign policy engagement with other states, State plays a key and longstanding role in interdiction policy. Since the 1990s, for instance, State has chaired four interagency working groups that review information on proliferation-related activities and take diplomatic and other actions to stop transfers that pose proliferation risks. These working groups are: the Nuclear Interdiction Action Group (NIAG) addressing proliferation of nuclear weapons-related technologies; the Missile Trade Analysis Group (MTAG) that focuses on the proliferation of equipment and technology that could support the development WMD delivery systems; the SHIELD, which follows transfers of technologies suitable for the production of chemical and biological weapons; and the Technology Transfer Working Group (TTWG), associated with the proliferation of conventional weapons technologies. Once it is understood that a transaction of proliferation concern may be in the works, or once information is obtained about global proliferation networks, the United States has a range of tools we can employ to try disrupt such activities. With diplomatic outreach, or through law enforcement or other channels, the United States might engage with foreign partners to enlist their help in stopping transactions en route, seizing and disposing of the items in question, arresting or expelling individuals involved, or shuttering associated commercial entities. Where mechanisms exist under legally binding provisions of United Nations Security Council resolutions, we can also report activities to the UN and seek to have entities designated as sanctions violators, so that other UN Member States will be legally obligated to act against these malefactors as well. Once a transfer of sensitive technology to a program of concern has occurred, there are a range of U.S. legal authorities that we in the United States can use to impose sanctions on the entities or individuals involved or those who protect or facilitate their work, imposing a financial and reputational cost and complicating these entities’ ability to conduct business. We might use Commerce, Treasury, or State Department authorities provided by various Executive Orders (EOs) to penalize support for proliferation-related activity and deny proliferators the materials and resources they need to do their dirty work. Beyond EOs, the United States can use a variety of statutory authorities to designate and apply sanctions to proliferators and their facilitators. The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act, for instance – or INKSNA – targets any entity, individual, or even a government that provides controlled items to those countries. It is but one of many laws in the U.S. arsenal. Employing multiple tools simultaneously and in a coordinated way can be extremely effective in enabling us to stop such activity in its tracks and chase the bad actors responsible around the world — making their lives as miserable and unprofitable as possible, and sometimes even getting them put behind bars. B. Working with Partners We don’t do all of this work alone. In fact, we’ve been working for years to build international CP partnerships, one of the most important of which is the Proliferation Security Initiative – which we refer to as PSI. Launched in 2003, PSI is a global effort to stop the trafficking of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. Originally a group of 11 states, 105 countries have now endorsed its Statement of Interdiction Principles. Three successive U.S. administrations have supported PSI. PSI partners agree to use their national capabilities and legal authorities to interdict transfers of proliferation concern, as well as to develop procedures to facilitate information exchange, strengthen national legal authorities for interdiction, and take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts. They also undertake exercises and capacity-building engagements that reinforce their CP like-mindedness and build habits of cooperation in stopping problematic transfers. Notably, PSI is an activity by likeminded partners, not a formal organization. It does not have “members,” a secretariat, a governing body, or even a formal accession process for joining. This informal and flexible framework, however, is a strength rather than a weakness, for it has helped PSI remain effective over time while avoiding the bureaucratic ossification, lowest-common-denominator consensus decision-making, and sterile formalities of so many international organizations and multilateral fora. PSI’s activities, workshops, and capacity-building engagements have helped partner countries create and sustain a community of policymakers and other experts good at cooperating together on interdiction-related activities. We work hard at this, and PSI continues to conduct a robust schedule of interdiction-related capacity-building events with partners around the world. III. Examples And we’ve had real successes in making proliferation-facilitating activity much more difficult, expensive, and risky — and, critically, more rare — than would otherwise have been the case. There is not, and cannot be, any kind of “100 percent solution” in the CP business, for the world is full of dangerous people seeking dangerous things, and no shortage of bad actors trying to make money by helping meet that demand. But our CP work supports critical U.S. national security priorities, and helps make the world a safer place, by disrupting such activities wherever possible and impeding progress on threat capabilities. Unfortunately, it is usually difficult to talk about CP successes in public. After all, a good deal of this work piggybacks on sensitive intelligence information and involves sensitive relationships with overseas partners — not all of whom are very eager to be known for such cooperation with the United States. It is often better to let the proliferators think that their latest gambit has just collapsed out of bad luck — or better yet, as a result of the incompetence or untrustworthiness of their counterparts in a proliferation network — than it is to let them know that when their deal fell apart, or when their colleague got arrested or their front company got shut down, there were a few of us at the State Department, at Treasury, or in the intelligence and law enforcement communities raising a glass and toasting each other for arranging it. But sometimes that is exactly what we do! A. The BBC China But let me offer a couple of illustrative successes that can be talked about. The classic example is now a fairly well-known one, and some of you may recall the merchant vessel BBC China — a ship diverted to Italy in October 2003 while carrying uranium enrichment gas centrifuges from the notorious Pakistani nuclear smuggler A.Q. Khan en route to the secret nuclear weapons program of Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi. The interdiction of the BBC China was the result of an epic intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement effort around the world that led to the dismantlement of Khan’s network and the revelation of its support to nuclear weapons programs in North Korea and Iran, as well as Libya. The ship’s seizure was also the catalyst making possible the conclusion of secret negotiations between U.S. and British officials and Libya over its WMD programs, and it led directly to Qaddafi’s renunciation of WMD and missile work in December 2003 and our successful negotiated and cooperative effort to remove these programs from Libya thereafter. This was a period of tremendous CP successes, and I am proud to have been — in my first period of State service — a part of the small army of U.S. interagency and international partners who contributed to bringing this about. B. DPRK Ship-to-Ship Transfers But that was a while ago now, so as a more recent example of successful work in this arena, I’ll offer you a case study in how we work to impede North Korea’s efforts to evade global nonproliferation sanctions through the use of illicit, ship-to-ship transfers of contraband. While focused largely on commodities such as coal, petroleum, and seafood, North Korea’s sanctions evasion networks provide revenue that helps advance and sustain Pyongyang’s WMD and missile programs. The JIN HYE was a Sierra Leone-flagged vessel photographed in December 2017 engaged in ship-to-ship transfer activity with another vessel in the East China Sea. UNSCRs prohibit ship-to-ship transfers with the DPRK. After we received these images as part of our global CP information-sharing network, U.S. detective work revealed that although the operator of the vessel tried to disguise its identity by painting false International Maritime Organization numbers on the side of the vessel, painting a false name and port of registry on its stern, and painting over its DPRK flag, the second ship was in fact the North Korean vessel CHON MA SAN. We now knew that the JIN HYE was engaged in sanctions evasion in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. Having figured this out, our diplomatic machine kicked into action. We presented this information to the United Nations DPRK Sanctions Committee, which designated the JIN HYE and the CHON MA SAN for violating UN sanctions on North Korea. This action imposed a port ban on both vessels, forbidding any UN Member State from allowing either ship in port. Additionally, the UN action obligated Sierra Leone to de-flag the JIN HYE, while the CHON MA SAN was subjected to an asset freeze. With these UN designations in hand, we sent out teams around the world to make life even more miserable for the JIN HYE’s operators. We worked with Sierra Leone to ensure it revoked the flag-of-convenience affiliation that the JIN HYEhad enjoyed, rendering the vessel officially stateless and in some sense akin to no more than a pirate on the high seas. We worked with other countries to revoke the ship’s official seaworthiness certification, to drop the insurance coverage that the JIN HYE had previously enjoyed, to close down the companies owning, operating, and managing the vessel, and even to arrest their management. This dramatically constrained the vessel’s ability to operate in the global maritime economy ever again. This is just one example, and of course things don’t always go so well. Nevertheless, this gives a taste of what we do, at State and elsewhere in the interagency, in using CP tools to protect the American people from the dangers of WMD, missile, and advanced conventional weapons proliferation. IV. Current Challenges My bureau — the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, or ISN — is the State Department’s lead for CP policy and operations, and I’m enormously proud of all the work our ISN team does on this. But CP requires unrelenting attention and commitment, and we still face a world full of threats. I’ll highlight five major challenges today. A. North Korea One continuing challenge, of course, is to exert sustained pressure on the North Korea to achieve the final, fully verified denuclearization, to which Chairman Kim Jong Un agreed at the Singapore summit. U.S. officials have been crystal clear about the importance of maintaining this pressure, and sanctions will remain until North Korea denuclearizes. We will keep working with partners around the world to improve their capability and their willingness to fight DPRK sanctions evasion. President Trump told the UN Security Council in September 2018 that ship-to-ship transfers “must end immediately,” and we are working with our partners to patrol the sea lanes and to detect, punish, and end such transfers. Indeed, we are working to shut down every tendril and node of the networks through which Pyongyang obtains revenue for its WMD and missile programs – and we need to keep doing so even while North Korea steps up efforts to trick our friends and allies into relaxing sanctions pressure in ways that would lead Pyongyang to conclude that it doesn’t have to implement denuclearization after all. B. Syria A second challenge relates to Syria, where the murderous Assad regime is in the final stages of slaughtering its citizens in pursuit of victory in that country’s tragic civil war. With the regime having so appallingly used chemical weapons in the war, we are concerned that Syria could soon seek to rebuild and advance its illegal chemical weapons capabilities, as well as its ballistic missile force. CP partners around the world thus need to be ready so that we can do everything possible to stop Syria’s chemical and missile recapitalization. C. Iran Third, until we have success in using our recently reimposed sanctions to persuade Iran to reach a better and more comprehensive negotiated solution with us, we and our global CP partners will need to be fiercely vigilant against Iranian proliferation. We will work tirelessly to disrupt the illicit networks through which Iran obtains technology and materials for its missile development, through which it provides missile technology to others, and through which Iran may attempt to obtain dual-use goods in support of a return to nuclear weapons work, or in support of its illicit chemical weapons capabilities. We will also address Iran’s proliferation of missiles and other advanced systems that threaten regional peace and stability. Finally, entities and individuals that support Iran’s procurement and proliferation activities should know that this exposes them to sanctions, and that we will not hesitate to penalize those who assist Iran’s illicit programs. D. Transshipment Nodes Fourth, we face today a major challenge from the ability of proliferator regimes such as Iran and North Korea to take advantage of major global transshipment points that otherwise facilitate legitimate trade. There is, unfortunately, ongoing trade in which both sensitive technologies and uncontrolled items flow through major transshipment nodes of the global trading economy and end up in the weapons systems of states such as Iran, Syria, or North Korea. Failures of enforcement in transshipment jurisdictions are thus contributing to regional and global instability, fueling conflicts that could explode catastrophically at any time. It is critical to do more against these transshipment threats — such as taking proactive steps to make full use of so-called “catch-all” export controls and implementing the efficient methods of cargo tracking and monitoring that are now available, but that some still choose not to use. Where necessary, we must crack down on those who refuse to help meet these threats. E. China As a fifth and final note, we face a major CP challenge from China, which still remains the supplier of choice for many of the world’s proliferators, especially with respect to missile technology. U.S. diplomats have repeatedly and insistently raised numerous proliferation cases with Chinese officials, but the response is uneven at best. Often, very little action is taken. Much of this we cannot discuss in public, but there is one longstanding case that I want to highlight before I conclude. Li Fangwei (also known as Karl Lee) is a key China-based broker for Iran’s ballistic missile program. Li continues to support Iran’s ongoing efforts to develop more sophisticated missiles and drive for self-sufficiency in its program. For more than a decade, we have sought to end Li’s support to Iran’s program, taking numerous legal and administrative actions against him and engaging extensively with the Chinese Government about his proliferation activity. This is important, because over his career, Li has supplied Iran with a full range of the materials required to construct ballistic missiles, and the equipment and components he has provided have contributed to Iran’s continued development of missiles with improved accuracy, range, and lethality. So let me be clear: Li Fangwei’s continued proliferation to Iran makes clear that Beijing has failed to take effective action to curb his activity. Beijing’s reluctance to take concrete measures to prevent Li’s ongoing support to Iran’s missile program suggests China chooses not to resolve this problem, calling into question its commitment to nonproliferation. China’s inability or unwillingness to curtail such activities is of ongoing, and increasing, concern — and it represents one of the key challenges in the counterproliferation business today. V. Conclusion So there’s much to be done, but I hope I’ve given you a taste of the nature and extent of our CP work. Despite usually flying “below the radar” of most public policy discourse, these counterproliferation efforts need and deserve unstinting commitment and high-level support from across the policy community, and I am pleased to have been able to draw your attention to them today. The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein. Secretary's Remarks: Global Magnitsky Sanctions on Individuals Involved in the Killing of Jamal Khashoggi 11/15/2018 You are subscribed to Secretary's Remarks for U.S. Department of State. This information has recently been updated, and is now available. Secretary's Remarks: Global Magnitsky Sanctions on Individuals Involved in the Killing of Jamal Khashoggi 11/15/2018 10:08 AM EST Press Statement Michael R. Pompeo Washington, DC November 15, 2018 Today, the United States imposed sanctions on seventeen Saudi Arabian individuals for serious human rights abuse resulting from their roles in the killing of Jamal Khashoggi at the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Istanbul, Turkey, on October 2. This action was taken under the authority of Executive Order 13818, which implements and builds upon the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. As a result of this action, all of these individuals’ assets within U.S. jurisdiction are blocked, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with them. At the time of Khashoggi’s killing, these individuals occupied positions in the Royal Court and several ministries and offices of the Government of Saudi Arabia. List of Sanctioned Individuals Saud al-Qahtani Maher Mutreb Salah Tubaigy Meshal Albostani Naif Alarifi Mohammed Alzahrani Mansour Abahussain Khalid Alotaibi Abdulaziz Alhawsawi Waleed Alsehri Thaar Alharbi Fahad Albalawi Badr Alotaibi Mustafa Almadani Saif Alqahtani Turki Alsehri Mohammed Alotaibi The Global Magnitsky Act empowers the United States to take significant steps to protect and promote human rights and combat corruption around the world. Our action today is an important step in responding to Khashoggi’s killing. The State Department will continue to seek all relevant facts, consult Congress, and work with other nations to hold accountable those involved in the killing of Jamal Khashoggi. The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein. Secretary's Remarks: On the Release of an American Citizen from North Korea  11/16/2018 You are subscribed to Secretary's Remarks for U.S. Department of State. This information has recently been updated, and is now available. Secretary's Remarks: On the Release of an American Citizen from North Korea  11/16/2018 01:07 PM EST Press Statement Michael R. Pompeo Washington, DC November 16, 2018 The United States appreciates the cooperation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the embassy of Sweden in facilitating the release of an American citizen. The United States is grateful for the sustained support of Sweden, our protecting power in North Korea, for its advocacy on behalf of American citizens. The safety and well-being of Americans remains one of the highest priorities of the Trump Administration. The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein. Secretary's Remarks: Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin Statements to the Press 11/16/2018 You are subscribed to Secretary's Remarks for U.S. Department of State. This information has recently been updated, and is now available. Secretary's Remarks: Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin Statements to the Press 11/16/2018 05:19 PM EST Remarks Michael R. Pompeo Treaty Room Washington, DC November 16, 2018 SECRETARY POMPEO: Good afternoon, everyone. It’s my honor today to welcome Minister Klimkin to Washington to breathe new life into the U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Partnership Commission and to reaffirm our unwavering support for a democratic Ukraine. It’s good to see you again. I saw you in Paris; it’s wonderful to spend some time with you again today, and I know you had a series of very productive meetings with our team as well. Ten years ago, we initiated this dialogue to advance our mutual interests and grow our bonds as free nations. Today, we achieved progress on three pillars of the relationship, and I’ll talk about each of them. First, security and countering Russian aggression; second, the rule of law and humanitarian issues; and finally, economic and energy security. We’re bolstering Ukrainian democracy, growing prosperity, and better equipping Ukraine to counter Russia’s aggressive designs on that country. Ukraine is at a critical point in history. During the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, the Ukrainian people sacrificed their lives to protect their independence and self-determination. They demanded that their government maintain Ukraine’s European orientation and end pervasive corruption. Ukrainians continue to fight this battle as they work to build a modern, democratic, Western state. They know that a free and well-governed nation is a hard-won victory, but it’s worth it. The United States supports those efforts and honors the achievements that you have made thus far. That same spirit of courage and determination drives Ukrainians to continue to fight to uphold their national sovereignty and territorial integrity in the face of Russian aggression. Ukraine has no greater friend than the United States in this regard. As we made clear in the Crimea Declaration this past summer, the United States will never accept Russia’s attempted annexation of Crimea. We will continue to impose consequences against Russia until Moscow fully implements the Minsk agreements and returns control of Crimea to Ukraine. As a show of our resolve, just last week we imposed a new round of sanctions on the supporters of Russian aggression in Ukraine. Our dialogue today also included important discussions on the rule of law, anticorruption, relations with neighbors, and human rights. We explored how we can work together to promote democratic principles, press freedom, and judicial independence. These are all staples of a thriving, free society. Advancing these crucial reform goals will ensure the ideals of the Revolution of Dignity are permanently woven into the fabric of a democratic Ukraine. By strengthening your political institutions, these reforms will also make Ukraine more resilient in the face of Russian aggression. And finally, we had a chance today to discuss energy security and economic reforms. We’ll keep working together to stop the Nord Stream 2 project that undermines Ukraine’s economic and strategic security and risks further compromising the sovereignty of European nations that depend on Russian gas. We do not want our European friends to fall prey to the kind of political and economic manipulation Russia has attempted in Ukraine since it cast off its Soviet shackles. Foreign Minister, thank you for being here today. FOREIGN MINISTER KLIMKIN: Secretary Pompeo, dear friends, I am very glad to come to Washington to meet with you and to launch together the work of our Strategic Partnership Commission. Thanks again, Mike, for the invitation. It’s a pleasure to be here. This year marks the 10th anniversary of the U.S.-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership. The commission unites a number of ministers and governmental agencies on both sides – such as defense, commerce, energy, foreign affairs – that work together to advance our broad and intensive agenda, and the shared goals enumerated in the charter. We’ve had a very good and productive discussion today on the whole range of issues that both our countries work on. I would like to stress that our strategic partnership is based on the common values that our two countries share. And today’s meeting showed once again that Ukraine and the United States have become real allies and friends. Today our countries stand shoulder to shoulder in countering Russia’s aggression. This aggression takes many forms. It’s the hot war in Ukraine, where Russia occupied Crimea and parts of Donbas, the war that took off over 11,000 people, the war which continued this very moment in the very heart of Europe. It also takes the form of trying to undermine democratic institutions in the U.S. and in Europe, including Ukraine. With presidential and parliamentary elections coming up into Ukraine, we are looking at U.S. experience in countering Russia’s election meddling, as well as sharing with the U.S. our experience in dealing with this risk. We share the peace through strength approach, and appreciate the U.S. leadership showing the strength in the face of Russian malign behavior. I would like to especially thank Secretary Pompeo once again for the Crimea Declaration, which was a demonstration of exactly such leadership and strength. We must not falter in the face of the aggressor, and pressure and the sanctions must remain in place until Moscow changes its course. However, so far we don’t see any change. On the contrary, we see Russia’s subversive activities in the Sea of Azov. We see shellings of our land and lives being lost every day. We see Ukrainian citizens held as political prisoners in Russian jails. And today, we discussed ways how Ukraine and the U.S. will continue to work together to strengthen our resilience. We appreciate the U.S. support in strengthening our defense capabilities, both through training of our military and through providing defense equipment. As partners on those Budapest memorandums, thereby, Ukraine gave up the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world – the memorandum blatantly violated by Russia – we will continue to further develop our security and defense cooperation. We will also continue to focus including in the framework for the Strategic Partnership Commission on strengthening, as the Secretary has just said, the rule of law in Ukraine; eradicating corruption, which is our most fundamental challenge aside from countering Russia's aggression; and further support of our civil society. We are thankful for U.S. support of Ukraine's steady progress towards eventual membership in NATO and the European Union, and we appreciate the U.S. support and understandings that today Ukraine is defending not only territorial but also spiritual independence. So thank you again for the support of our spiritual independence and to create autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church. We have also talked today about further expanding and giving a boost to our trade and investment as well as actual cooperation. Our trade increased 1.6 times over the past year. We can think about new ideas in this field such as exploring the possibility of a free trade area in the future. Thanks, again, Mike for this invitation. Thank you for your very strong personal support. I look forward to welcoming you in Ukraine for the next round of our Strategic Partnership Commission in not-too-distant future. Thanks a lot. SECRETARY POMPEO: Thank you. Wonderful to see you. Great, thank you. The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein. Europe and Eurasia: Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin Statements to the Press 11/16/2018 You are subscribed to Europe and Eurasia for U.S. Department of State. This information has recently been updated, and is now available. Europe and Eurasia: Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin Statements to the Press 11/16/2018 05:19 PM EST